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For the better part of the past decade, the world economy has been dominated by a world 
economic order that combined Chinese export-led development with US over-
consumption. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 likely marks the beginning of the end of 
the Chimerican relationship. In this paper we look at this era as economic historians, 
trying to set events in a longer-term perspective. In some ways China's economic model 
in the decade 1998-2007 was similar to the one adopted by West Germany and Japan 
after World War II. Trade surpluses with the U.S. played a major role in propelling 
growth. But there were two key differences. First, the scale of Chinese currency 
intervention was without precedent, as were the resulting distortions of the world 
economy. Second, the Chinese have so far resisted the kind of currency appreciation to 
which West Germany and Japan consented. We conclude that Chimerica cannot persist 
for much longer in its present form. As in the 1970s, sizeable changes in exchange rates 
are needed to rebalance the world economy. A continuation of Chimerica at a time of 
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For the better part of the past decade the world economy has been dominated by a unique 
geo-economic constellation that we have called “Chimerica”: a world economic order 
that combined Chinese export-led development with US over-consumption on the basis 
of a financial marriage between the world's sole superpower and its most likely future 
rival (Ferguson and Schularick, 2007). For China, the key attraction of this marriage was 
its potential to propel the economy forward by means of export-led growth. Thanks to the 
Chimerican symbiosis, China was able to quadruple its GDP since 2000, raise exports by 
a factor of five, import western technology and create tens of millions of manufacturing 
jobs for the rural poor. For America, Chimerica meant being able to consume more, save 
less and still maintain low interest rates and a stable rate of investment. Over-
consumption meant that between 2000 and 2008 the United States outspent its national 
income by a cumulative 45 percent, i.e. total U.S. spending over the period was 45 per 
cent higher than total income (Reisen, 2009). Purchases of goods from China in excess of 
income accounted for about a third of over-consumption. 
  For a time, it seemed like a marriage made in heaven. Chimerica accounted for 
around 13 per cent of the world’s land surface, a quarter of its population, more than a 
third of its gross domestic product, and around two fifths of global economic growth in 
the past ten years. It also seemed like a marriage with positive externalities for the rest of 
the world. Global trade boomed and nearly all asset prices surged. Yet, like many another 
marriage between a saver and a spender, Chimerica was not destined to last. We believe 
the financial and economic crisis of 2007-9 has put the marriage on the rocks. The 
reduction of the imbalance between the United States and China—in short, the 
dissolution of Chimerica—is now indispensable if equilibrium is to be restored to the 
world economy.  
In this paper, we consider the much-discussed problem of global imbalances as 
economic historians, trying to set events in a longer-term perspective. We argue that 
China's economic ascent came about as a result of a strategy of export-led growth 
following the earlier examples of West Germany and Japan after World War II. However, 
a key difference was the sheer scale of Chinese currency intervention and the 
corresponding reserve accumulation. The resulting distortions for the world economy 
were also far greater than anything seen in the 1950s and 1960s. In the presence of highly   3
integrated and poorly regulated financial markets, this massive reserve accumulation 
sparked a debt-fuelled asset bubble in the West, again unlike anything seen in the post-
war decades Taken together, these differences render comparisons with the Bretton 
Woods system of very limited use (Dooley et al., 2003).  
We believe that the imbalances of the past decade were to a large degree a 
function of exchange rate undervaluation and will not be resolved automatically without 
major exchange rate adjustments. The historical record has shown time and again that 
policies of real exchange rate undervaluation can be sustained for a long time without 
generating the inflationary pressures predicted in economic theory. Indeed, economic 
historians have often seen real exchange rate policies as important factors in explaining 
growth performance, in particular in the postwar catching-up process in Europe 
(Eichengreen, 2007). Cheap relative production costs supported the profitability and 
hence investment in manufacturing industries, while surplus labor or organized wage 
restraint avoided a loss of competitiveness. Thus we do not agree that Chinese surpluses 
can be explained simply in terms of household savings behavior. We see the Chimerican 
world as the result of a policy of intervention in foreign exchange markets that served 
two goals: to promote export-led industrialization and to build a cushion against future 
financial crises. Due to the pervasive role of the state in China's financial sector, the 
effectiveness of capital controls and the large supply of surplus labor, a policy of real 
exchange rate undervaluation and reserve accumulation was not automatically corrected 
by inflation in the way that some economic models predict. Growing real exchange rate 
undervaluation can account for many of the striking features of China's recent growth 
spurt that are otherwise hard to reconcile: a sharp increase in domestic investment, which 
was accompanied by an even stronger rise in national savings. The savings surge was 
driven by corporate profits, not by households, and was especially pronounced in 
exchange-rate sensitive manufacturing industries. 
Nor do we think the precipitous decline of the U.S. savings rate and the widening 
of the current account deficit were simply consequences of behavioral changes by the 
American public.  Government policies on the other side of the Pacific were also partly 
responsible for the build-up of the imbalances. The Federal Reserve mistakenly turned a 
blind eye to the asset bubble being inflated by excessive financial and household leverage   4
and the distortion of interest rates by Chimerica. The Congress was much too cavalier in 
promoting home ownership regardless of households’ ability to service their mortgages. 
The Treasury and other responsible bodies underestimated the systemic risks created by 
financial engineering and particularly by the explosive growth of the over-the-counter 
derivatives market.   
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 marks the beginning of the end of the 
Chimerican relationship. First, the Chinese authorities understand that heavily indebted 
American consumers cannot be relied upon to return as buyers of Chinese goods on the 
scale of the period up to 2007. Second, the Chinese dislike their exposure to the U.S. 
dollar in the form of close to two trillions of USD-denominated reserve assets. But the 
temptations to continue business as usual are also great on both sides. In order to 
stimulate their ailing export industries, the Chinese authorities seem resolved to carry on 
pegging their currency to the dollar. American policy makers seem equally willing to 
prolong America's addiction to cheap money as long as the economy is in precarious 
state.  
This paper argues that the end of Chimerica is desirable, though the divorce needs 
to be amicable and its costs kept down. In the light of our analysis, currency adjustments 
must become a top priority in the international political debate. The world economy's key 
structural imbalance is that the second biggest economy in the world has pegged its 
currency to that of the largest economy at a strongly undervalued exchange rate. In the 
depressed conditions caused by the financial crisis, this peg poses a double threat. First, it 
limits U.S. recovery by overvaluing the dollar in key Asian markets. Secondly, as the 
dollar weakens against other developed world currencies—notably the euro and the 
yen—the burden of adjustment falls disproportionately on Europe and Japan, since dollar 
depreciation translates automatically into renminbi depreciation, through the action of the 
peg. This is a recipe for protectionist responses and new distortions.  
Historically, big adjustments in relative production costs and income levels have 
generally come about as exchange rate adjustments. Between 1960 and 1978, for 
example, the deutsche mark appreciated cumulatively by almost 60 per cent against the 
dollar, while the Japanese yen appreciated by almost 50 per cent. The lesson from history 
is that exporters can live with substantial exchange rate revaluations when major gains in   5
productivity are being achieved. The world—and particularly China—should prepare for 
similar adjustments if it is to draw the right conclusions from the current financial crisis.  
 
 
I. Chimerica and the crisis 
 
China's integration into the world economy was by far the most important development 
of the economic history of the past decade. In the 1990s Zhu Rongji and his right-hand 
man Wen Jiabao embraced foreign trade and foreign direct investment as cornerstones of 
a new Chinese development strategy (Bernstetter and Lardy, 2002). They convinced 
other members of the leadership in Beijing to embark on a strategy of export-led growth 
following the examples of its East Asian neighbors, Japan and Korea, but also imitating 
the policies adopted by many European economies under the post-war Bretton Woods 
system (Dooley et al., 2003; Eichengreen, 2007). Following substantial renminbi 
devaluation in 1994 and the opening up of the economy to FDI, the strategy quickly bore 
fruit as multinational companies started to relocate production to China. The Chinese 
export machine began to take off rapidly after WTO accession in 2001, generating higher 
and higher trade surpluses. Exports in 2000 were in the range of $250 billion, but climbed 
to $1.3 trillion in 2008. China's current account surplus in 2001 was a mere $17 billion. 
By the end of 2008, it was approaching $400 billion.  
As exports expanded, the authorities in Beijing consistently bought dollars to 
avoid appreciation of their currency. China's currency interventions served two goals: 
first, to promote export competitiveness, since export industries provided rapid 
productivity gains as well as new jobs and income; second, to build up reserves as a 
cushion against the risks associated with growing economic and financial integration, 
painfully illustrated by the experience of other countries in the 1997-8 Asian Crisis 
(Feldstein, 1999; Obstfeld et al., 2009). For political reasons, the Communist Party 
leadership in Beijing feared financial instability even more than other governments and 
was unwilling to subject itself to the vagaries of international capital markets.  
The result of sustained currency intervention was a vast accumulation of dollar-
denominated securities in the reserves of the People’s Bank of China and the State   6
Agency for Foreign Exchange (SAFE). Already by 2000 China had currency reserves of 
$165 billion, slightly above 10 per cent of GDP. In 2009 currency reserves reached $2.3 
trillion, equivalent to more than 50 per cent of China's annual output (Setser and Pandey, 
2009). As we and others have argued, such persistent currency intervention caused a 
growing distortion in the global cost of capital: the real economic shock of China's 
integration into the world economy should have led to a lower capital-labor ratio and 
hence higher real interest rates (Ferguson and Schularick, 2007). But global interest 
rates—both long-term and short-term—continued to fall.  
The accumulation of large war chests of foreign reserves through currency 
intervention opened up a Pandora's box of financial distortions. Ben Bernanke argued that 
a “glut” of savings from emerging markets was a key factor in the decline of U.S. and 
global real-long term interest rates, despite the parallel fall in U.S. savings and the fact 
that the U.S. deficit manifested itself before the Chinese surplus. Lower interest rates in 
turn enabled American households to increase consumption levels and worsened the 
imbalance between savings and investment. And, because foreign savings were 
predominantly channeled through government (or central bank) hands into safe assets 
such as Treasuries, private investors turned elsewhere to look for higher yields. This led 
to a more general re-pricing of financial risk, which in turn incentivized financial 
engineers to develop new financial products such as securitized debt instruments.
1 
This is not to say that reserve accumulation was the only cause for the current 
crisis. The financial disaster that began in 2007 had multiple causes: regulation built on 
the idea of the efficiency of financial markets; incentives for bankers that encouraged 
them to focus on short-term profits and stock market performance; a Federal Reserve 
policy of ignoring asset bubbles; and, last but not least, the willingness of Anglo-Saxon 
households to turn themselves into highly leveraged, unhedged investment vehicles that 
speculated on real estate. Beijing cannot be blamed for the reckless lending and 
borrowing engaged in by Western financial institutions. Yet had it not been for the 
Chinese willingness to fund America’s consumption and real estate speculation habit, 
long-term interest rates in the United States would almost certainly have been 
substantially higher, acting as a circuit breaker for the housing bubble. It was not 
                                                 
1 Economic Report of the President (2009); see also Hunt (2008).   7
“financial terror” that brought Chimerica to an abrupt end, as some commentators had 
feared. The main threat, as it turned out, was the distortion of global interest rates and the 
complacency it generated. Bankrolled by China, the U.S. economy overdosed on debt.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to argue that a world order built on net 
capital flows from China to America was bound to end in tears. (That was why our term 
“Chimerica” was always intended as a play on the word “chimera”.) In the past decade 
capital was flowing in large quantities on a net basis to an economy that presumably had 
a lower marginal productivity of capital than the lender economy. Capital flows that were 
not driven by higher rates of return on investment financed a boom in consumption and a 
decade of household dis-saving. Investment spending in the U.S. did not increase in the 
past decade and capital inflows merely substituted for household savings.  
 
 
II. Export-led growth and reserve accumulation: a historical perspective 
 
An export-centered growth strategy coupled with currency intervention and reserve 
accumulation is nothing new. After all, Western Europe and Japan as well as South Korea 
and Taiwan all successfully pursued similar strategies. In all cases, productivity gains 
coupled with wage restraint led to the rapid development of the manufacturing sector and 
sustained export growth. Rising corporate profits financed rising investment, which in 
turn supported manufacturing capacity and productivity (Eichengreen, 2007). For some 
commentators, the resemblance between these past growth strategies and modern China’s 
was so close that it was legitimate to refer to “Bretton-Woods II” (Dooley et al., 2003).  
It is therefore illuminating to compare China with West Germany and Japan 
during their phase of rapid catching-up. At first sight, the analogy is close. In terms of 
gross domestic product measured in current dollars, both West Germany and Japan in the 
1960s were about 10-15 per cent of size of the United States. China's economy in the year 
2000 was also about 12 per cent of the size of the U.S. economy (though it is much 
bigger on the basis of purchasing power parity). All three countries owed much of their 
rapid growth to manufacturing, albeit with very different specializations. However, there 
the resemblances end. Figures 1 and 2 show the amount of dollar-denominated reserves   8
accumulated by West Germany and Japan from the 1950s to the 1970s and by China 
since 1990. In the first chart we scale the stock of dollar reserves by U.S. GDP to show 
the relative size and impact of currency interventions on the American economy.
2 The 
second chart displays the accumulated reserve stocks in percentages of national GDP. 
The charts demonstrate how outsized China's reserve accumulation has been 
compared with previous periods of export-led growth. At the height of post-war growth 
in the 1960s, West Germany and Japan grew their dollar reserves basically in line with 
U.S. GDP, keeping the ratio stable at about 1 per cent before moving slightly higher in 
the early 1970s when capital flows and valuation gains led to an increase. On a yearly 
basis, reserve accumulation was about 1 per cent of GDP on average in Germany, and not 
even 0.5 per cent in Japan. By contrast, a dramatic shift in Chinese reserve accumulation 
occurred in the early 2000s. Starting at a level of dollar reserves equivalent to about 1 per 
cent of US GDP in 2000, China's reserves reached 5 per cent of U.S. GDP in 2005, rising 
to 8 per cent in 2007 and finally reaching about 10 per cent in 2008. At the end of 2009, 
China's USD reserves are likely to be equivalent to 12 per cent of U.S. GDP, compared to 
about 1 per cent a decade ago. The picture is similar if we scale reserve assets by national 
GDP. Both Germany and Japan during their periods of export-led growth kept reserve 
stocks relatively stable to their GDP at around 5 per cent. From 1992 on, China’s reserves 
rose from 5 per cent to above 50 per cent of national GDP. Annual average net 
accumulation over the past decade stands at 7.5 per cent of GDP.  
  
                                                 
2 In China's case we assumed 70 per cent of reserves are held in dollars: for Germany and Japan we assumed 
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What accounts for the unprecedented amount of reserve accumulation in China? In 
table 1 we show current account, capital account and reserve account flows by country 
and year, contrasting the 1955-1975 period for Germany and Japan with the past two 
decades for China. First, China's reserve accumulation was mainly driven by the trade 
account surpluses. These in turn are far higher than anything seen by either Germany or 
Japan. Second, China had much higher capital inflows, a reflection of a higher degree of 
financial integration today than under the Bretton Woods system and more outsourcing of 
production. Clearly, then, the comparison with Bretton Woods is somewhat misleading.   10
Figure 3 makes clear that despite high capital inflows, Chinese reserve accumulation has 
mainly been a function of a massive trade surpluses which the authorities prevented from 
translating into a stronger currency by continued market interventions. This time really 
was different. 
 
Table 1: Current account, capital account and reserve growth, per cent of GDP



















1955 1.24 -0.35 1.02 0.98 0.34 0.13 1990 2.97 0.60 2.86
1956 2.24 -0.08 2.52 -0.13 0.09 0.66 1991 3.13 0.87 3.32
1957 2.73 -1.23 2.37 -2.06 0.38 -1.38 1992 1.28 1.42 -0.41
1958 2.59 -1.01 1.49 0.82 0.29 1.05 1993 -1.81 4.08 0.28
1959 1.66 -2.56 -0.68 0.99 -0.75 1.26 1994 1.19 6.06 5.23
1960 1.58 0.42 2.65 0.32 -0.16 1.13 1995 0.21 4.58 2.97
1961 0.96 -1.51 -0.69 -1.83 0.02 -0.63 1996 0.81 4.46 3.55
1962 -0.44 -0.17 -0.24 -0.08 0.46 0.58 1997 3.75 4.94 3.64
1963 0.26 0.16 0.72 -1.12 0.82 0.05 1998 3.01 3.58 0.60
1964 0.12 -0.32 0.10 -0.58 0.41 0.15 1999 1.95 2.38 0.80
1965 -1.36 0.47 -0.28 1.02 -0.52 0.12 2000 1.71 2.79 0.89
1966 0.10 -0.12 0.40 1.18 -0.82 -0.03 2001 1.31 1.36 3.58
1967 2.02 -2.40 -0.03 -0.15 -0.25 -0.06 2002 2.44 2.51 5.17
1968 2.22 -1.15 1.31 0.71 -0.02 0.60 2003 2.80 3.57 7.10
1969 1.25 -3.13 -2.40 1.23 0.01 0.35 2004 3.55 3.77 10.67
1970 0.45 2.14 3.21 0.97 -0.43 0.44 2005 7.19 2.81 9.27
1971 0.39 1.36 1.40 2.52 0.59 4.71 2006 9.53 -0.40 9.29
1972 0.29 1.41 1.78 2.17 -0.83 1.03 2007 10.99 4.14 13.65
1973 1.21 1.34 1.70 -0.03 -1.77 -1.48 2008 9.85 3.17 9.68
1974 2.42 -0.61 -0.89 -1.02 -0.46 0.28
1975 1.10 0.00 0.22 -0.14 -0.28 -0.14
Mean 1.10 -0.35 0.75 0.27 -0.14 0.42 3.47 2.98 4.85
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Fig. 3: Current account, capital account, reserve growth in China 




Given the scale of Chinese currency interventions, a natural question to ask is 
how the authorities were able to maintain internal equilibrium. Economic historians are 
familiar with the Bundesbank's fight for internal price stability in the face of capital 
inflows and current account surpluses under the Bretton Woods regime (Emminger, 
1977; Holtfrerich, 1998). These problems seem negligible by comparison with the 
Chinese case. In a standard model, exchange rate intervention should lead to monetary 
expansion, which in turn drives up domestic prices, nullifying the real effect of 
intervention (McKinnon, 2006). China's financial system, however, is owned and 
managed by the government. Capital controls are in place for most non-FDI types of 
flows and give monetary policy considerable room for maneuver. Sterilization and bank 
lending policies are dealt with by decree, so that the government can force banks to buy 
trillions of low-yielding renminbi sterilization bonds or alter their reserve ratios. Deposit 
and lending rates are also set by the government. This has allowed China to intervene in 
the currency market, while retaining control over domestic monetary aggregates. Reserve 
accumulation has not translated into runaway growth of monetary aggregates (at least not 
until the unprecedented loosening in financial conditions that took place in the first half 
of 2009).  
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III. The exchange rate and the savings glut 
 
Looking at China's massive reserve accumulation, some commentators routinely point to 
the savings behavior of Chinese households.  The Chinese current account surplus is seen 
as a function of underlying savings, largely unaffected by the exchange rate (McKinnon, 
2007). Cultural factors are thought to lead to a very high precautionary household savings 
rate. The trouble with this view is that there has been no change in the savings rate of 
Chinese households in the past decade while the current account surplus has climbed to 
double digits (Kuijs, 2005; Wolf, 2009). In reality, the increase in total savings in the past 
decade has come mainly from retained corporate earnings and surpluses of government-
owned companies, as shown in figure 4. The increase in corporate profits in the past 
decade has been very strong and tracked the ballooning trade surplus as shown in figure 
5. Profits of Chinese industry have risen eightfold since 2000 while the trade balance 
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Fig. 4: Savings rates in China, per cent of GDP
Source: CEIC, Goldman Sachs (Hong Kong)
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Fig. 5: The trade surplus and industrial profits in China, 
2000-2008





A key question is what role currency undervaluation played in generating the 
increase of both the trade surpluses and corporate profits. To be sure, some economists 
argued for a long time that the renminbi was undervalued (see Goldstein, 2006; 2008) 
and warned of the inherent dangers of this distortion. But their warnings were not popular 
in a world of low interest rates and booming asset markets. The immediate effects on 
America and the West were seductively positive. Rising consumption and low bond 
yields promoted growth and sustained asset prices. Cheap Chinese goods kept goods 
inflation low. Even the Fed bought into the argument that credibility gains and higher 
productivity of the U.S. economy were behind the decline in interest rates.  
By how much is the Chinese currency undervalued? Estimates for the 
undervaluation range widely from zero to 50 per cent (Goldstein, 2008) depending on the 
methodology adopted. In our view, the most promising approach has been to focus on the 
unit labor cost based real exchange rate between the renminbi and the dollar (Ferguson 
and Schularick, 2007).
3 Unit labor costs are defined as the cost of the labor inputs (total 
wages) needed to produce a unit of output. If these productivity gains (relative to the 
productivity gains abroad) are not reflected in proportionate exchange rate changes, the 
                                                 
3 These distortions render official CPI and PPI data less meaningful. Moreover, China's economic ascent is a 
story of job creation in manufacturing industries with a great role played by labor costs.    14
economy gains in competitiveness and more production will be relocated to the cheaper 
currency area.  Table 2 shows the key metrics needed to calculate unit labor costs in 
China.  We find that, that while wages and employment in China have grown rapidly in 
recent years, the increase in output has been even faster thanks to rapid productivity 
gains. Chinese unit labor costs fell in eight out of last nine years, sometimes substantially. 
The nominal revaluation of the renminbi by approximately 15 per cent since July 2005 
has not been enough to counteract this trend.  
 

















of RMB on 
ULC basis 
2000 14.0  12.3  -1.6  -3.4  4.9  -8.3 0.0  8.3 
2001 14.5  11.7  0.4  -2.4  0.8  -3.1 0.0  3.1 
2002 20.1  12.6  -3.8  -11.3  0.4  -11.6 0.0  11.6 
2003 27.0  13.6  2.1  -11.3  0.8  -12.1 0.0  12.1 
2004 21.1  12.3  5.9  -2.9  -0.2  -2.7 0.0  2.7 
2005 27.0  12.3  7.2  -7.5  -2.9  -4.7 -1.0  3.7 
2006 23.6  14.0  7.2  -2.4  3.1  -5.4 -2.7  2.8 
2007 26.6  16.2  7.7  -2.7  0.1  -2.8 -4.7  -2.0 
2008 13.8  11.0  2.7  0.0  2.6  -2.6 -8.5  -5.9 
Sources: Output, employment and wage figures from CEIC and Banister (2005, 2007, 2009); US unit 
labor costs come from the BLS database. 
Note: Chinese data for 2008 are estimates based on Goldman Sachs, Hong Kong.   
 
As figure 6 shows, Chinese unit labor costs today are about 40 per cent lower than 
in 1998, while the nominal exchange rate has only appreciated by 15 per cent, leaving a 
net gain in wage competitiveness of 25 per cent. Despite the currency adjustment, in 
other words, manufacturing production today in China is much cheaper in dollar terms 
than it was eight years ago. The table demonstrates that the mechanism which is 
supposed to correct international imbalances – by raising China’s price level relative to 
America’s – was not operating in the past decade. Nor did revaluation after 2005   15
compensate for the growing competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing. As figure 7 
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ULC trend in manufacturing RMB per USD
Fig. 6: Unit labor costs in Chinese manufacturing and 
the RMB/USD exchange rate
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Fig. 7: The ULC-based real exchange rate and 
China's current account surplus, 1995-2008
Source: own calculations, IFS
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Economists are usually quick to doubt the long-run sustainability of policies 
based on real exchange rate undervaluation. Yet, as the financial crisis has reminded us, 
inductive economic theory can be convincing on paper but misleading in practice. Recent 
empirical and historical studies have painted a nuanced picture of growth strategies based 
on real exchange rate undervaluation (Rodrik, 2008; Eichengreen, 2008; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2007). These authors have argued that in practice policies of real exchange 
rate undervaluation are possible over relatively long periods and often seem to deliver 
success. One mechanism through which a cheap exchange rate leads to growth is through 
changing the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods, depressing real wages and 
thereby boosting corporate savings and investment (Gala, 2007; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2007). Essentially the same thing can be said about China's development 
over the past decade. Moreover, the massive supply of unskilled labor from the 
countryside prevented broad-based wage pressures from emerging. Spill-over effects 
from the tradable to the non-tradable sector – the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect – 
were therefore slow to materialize. With a combination of capital controls, tight 
regulation of credit and a huge pool of unorganized labor, Beijing was able to operate a 
consistently undervalued real exchange rate without generating high inflation.  
 
 
IV. The 64,000 Renminbi question 
 
Plenty of estimates for the fair value of the Chinese currency already exist. Our aim here 
is not to give yet another questionable estimate for a fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate for China.
4 Instead, we want to focus on a measure of competitiveness of 
manufacturing production in China. In order to get an idea about the competitiveness 
advantages conveyed to Chinese industry by a "cheap" exchange rate, we compare the 
level of dollar wages in China with dollar wages in other economies, controlling for 
differences in labor productivity. Simply speaking, one would expect that differences in 
wages, expressed in the same currency (i.e. in dollars), should ultimately reflect 
                                                 
4 An excellent survey can be found in Goldstein and Lardy, 2008.   17
differences in worker productivity. In other words, wages in China should be 
considerably lower than in the U.S. on the grounds that Chinese workers have less capital 
to work with and are therefore less productive.  Yet persistent differences in wages – 
even after adjusting for productivity differences -- could signal exchange rate 
misalignments.  
The data for 2008 show hourly Chinese dollar wages in manufacturing of about 
$1.20 compared to $31.00 in the U.S. Thus, Chinese wages were on average only about 4 
per cent of those in US industry. At the same time, Chinese GDP per capita stood at 
about 20 per cent of the US level, hence aggregate productivity was considerably higher 
than the wage level implies. While this gap might seem big at first, such deviations are 
not uncommon in developing countries. We therefore aim to make the comparison more 
systematic and look at a broad historical sample of 10 developing countries over the past 
30 years. The question we ask empirically is whether the gap between wages and 
productivity in China is artificially low judged by the experience of other developing 
countries in the past three decades. This simple and intuitive approach we have in mind 
has proven particularly useful in the context of economies that transition from 
communism to free market. As prices are not fully liberalized in transition economies, 
reliable estimates of the price level are hard to come by (Wyplosz, 1996; Krajnak et al., 
1998).
  
We use the data on hourly wages in manufacturing from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, which are available for a broad sample of developing and developed economies 
since 1996. We complement these figures with Chinese data that have recently been 
made available by the BLS thanks to the painstaking effort of Judith Banister (2005, 
2007, 2009). Chinese wage data are very difficult to compile and many institutional 
differences such as in-kind payments, various additional wage-like benefits and the 
differences between state-owned enterprises and private as well as between coastal and 
western regions have to be taken into account. To give an example, in Banister’s 
calculations the average hourly wage in Chinese manufacturing in the year 2007 was 
about $1.77 for urban workers and 97 cents for all workers. Assuming a 45 hour work 
week, this would correspond to monthly wages of $345 in urban areas and about $190 for 
all workers. Such numbers are accepted as realistic by experts on the ground.   18
We control for productivity differences using GDP per capita data in purchasing 
power parities from the World Bank. If anything, this approach is likely to understate 
labor productivity in Chinese manufacturing. First, we use the 2005 variant of the World 
Bank PPP data, which show a Chinese GDP per capita almost 40 per cent lower than 
previously assumed.
5  Second, we denominate output by population, not workers, which, 
given China's large remaining agricultural workforce, almost certainly understates the 
productivity levels in the tradable sector. Productivity could also be understated in light 
of considerable growth rates of physical investment in China which have led to a much 
higher stock of capital per worker than in comparable developing countries. All in all, we 
therefore think that our estimates are more likely to understate than to overstate Chinese 
manufacturing productivity.  
The dependent variable in the regression is the dollar wage level relative to the 
United States. The results of the panel estimation, using data for ten developing 
economies over the 1980-2008 period, are shown in table 3. On the base of the estimated 
coefficients, we then perform out-of-sample calculations of the "fair" exchange for China. 
This is the exchange rate that would eliminate such differences in wages between China 
and other countries as are not accounted for by lower productivity of Chinese workers. 
The result is telling: the point estimates vary, but the current exchange rate, after 
adjusting for differences in productivity, is clearly undervalued by somewhere between 
30 and 48 per cent. As noted above, there are some good reasons to believe that these 
estimates are likely to mark to the lower bound. To put things into perspective, an 
exchange rate adjustment of 30-50 per cent would simply erase the competitive 
advantage that China has built up relative to other developing countries over the past 
thirty years. Even a 50 per cent adjustment would result in Chinese wages reaching about 
8 per cent of U.S. levels, instead of the current 4 per cent (compared to a productivity 
level of 20 per cent). In short, given the rapid productivity gains of recent years, China's 
export sector remains highly competitive and the real exchange rate strongly 
                                                 
5 The latest ICP study showed a surprisingly high Chinese price level which was almost 40 per cent higher 
than previously assumed. However, the study was carried out by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistic and 
international verification was limited. The higher price had the effect of lowering Chinese per capita GDP in 
purchasing power parities by the same amount with the effects of making China a lot poorer than previously 
thought.    19
undervalued. The consequences of  this exchange undervaluation have become too big 
for the world economy to bear.  
 
pooled random effects fixed effects
Observations 149 149 149
Countries 10 10 10
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.83
GDP per capita relative to US (log) 1.096*** 1.204*** 1.300***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.333*** -0.257* -0.146
(0.000) (0.066) (0.166)
       RMB/USD 3.56 4.18 4.52
       undervaluation in per cent 48% 39% 34%
Note:  P-values in brackets; *** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.01, ** p-value 
smaller than 0.05, * p-value smaller than 0.1, country sample 1980-2008: Brazil, 
Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Spain, Philippines, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary. Source
Exchange rate that would align Chinese dollar-wages with productivity:
Dependent variable: dollar wage level relative to US (log)





V. Exchange rate adjustments in history 
 
The story so far is that the Chinese economy underwent rapid gains in productivity over 
the past decade. Unit labor costs continued to fall for most of the period in absolute terms 
and relative to other countries. These gains were not translated into exchange rate 
realignments, leading to massive gains in competitiveness for China. Despite the vagaries 
of Chinese statistics, we think there is strong evidence that productivity-adjusted 
production in China today is 40 per cent cheaper than a decade ago. As a result, trade 
surpluses have jumped, corporate profits have boomed and inward investment has surged, 
resulting in unprecedented reserve accumulation. This has been a major contributor to the 
global imbalances which have played such an important role in the financial crisis. 
Currency adjustment is clearly much needed. We have shown that a 30-40 per cent   20
revaluation of the renminbi would barely suffice to bring productivity-adjusted wage 
costs in China into line with what they should be. Yet a currency adjustment of this 
magnitude is likely to be strongly opposed by China. In the following, we again take a 
look at the postwar rise of Germany and Japan to put the Chinese case into historical 
context. In particular, we want answers to two crucial questions. First, how large would 
such an alignment of the value of the currency be by historical standards? Second, what 
does the historical experience tell us about how changes in relative unit labor costs occur 
over time? 
Owing to the rapid productivity gains during the "economic miracle" in the 1950s, 
Germany started to run external surpluses soon after the transition to full current account 
convertibility was made in 1958 (Emminger, 1977). Against the background of full 
employment and rising inflationary pressures the Bundesbank quickly faced a conflict 
between internal and external goals, i.e. between domestic price stability and exchange 
rate stability, which became a central policy issue for the following decade. Interestingly, 
the Bundesbank was at first inclined to give priority to the external equilibrium, and it 
was government that pushed for revaluation, arguing that internal stability should take 
priority (Holtfrerich, 1998). This prepared the ground for the first revaluation from 4.20 
to 4 DM per dollar in March 1961. The realignment was generally seen as too small, 
however, and by the end of the decade the German currency was back under pressure to 
appreciate against both the dollar and the other European currencies. A number of 
devaluations of close trading partners (such as the 14 per cent devaluation of the British 
pound in 1967) effectively resulted in a continuous trade-weighted appreciation of the 
currency. The next revaluation (by 9.3 per cent) was forced on the authorities in 1969 as a 
reaction to the weakness in the other European currencies and the dollar. As the Bretton 
Woods System slowly disintegrated, the mark became the "antipode" of the dollar and 
large swings in capital flows complicated the management of the currency. Faced with 
another wave of capital flows, on May 5, 1971, Germany closed the exchange window in 
order to preserve the internal value of the currency and the mark floated freely in 1971 
until the Smithsonian agreement led to a new parity that was about 14 per cent stronger 
against the dollar. But the Smithsonian agreement provided only temporary relief. 
Another 10 per cent revaluation followed on February 12, 1973. Finally, the mark   21
revalued by another 3 per cent before the joint float of the European currency snake 
against the dollar started  later that same year. In the following years, the dollar continued 
to weaken. By 1975 the cumulative appreciation of the mark against the dollar since 1960 
approached 60 per cent.  
  Japan's postwar development strategy was even more focused on exports. The 
exchange rate was the center of the macroeconomic policies (Eichengreen and Hatanase, 
2007). The rate was fixed at 360 yen per dollar and remained at that level until 1970. In 
the tumultuous year 1971, the Bank of Japan at first tried to resist pressure to appreciate, 
but finally allowed the yen to float to 314 per dollar. After the collapse of the 
Smithsonian agreement in 1973, the yen floated upwards to 265 per dollar and by 1978 it 
had broken the critical mark of 200. However, unlike the German authorities, the Bank of 
Japan was more willing to forsake some internal stability to keep the exchange rate stable 
and at competitive levels. In 1974, the Japanese inflation rate briefly reached 25 per cent. 
In total, the Japanese currency appreciated by about 45 per cent in the course of the 1970s 

























Fig. 8: Germany and Japan: cumulative currency revaluation 




A number of important lessons can be learned from these two historical episodes. 
First, a nominal appreciation of the order of 40 per cent within a few years would be no 
historical novelty. Many of the same questions that Chinese policy-makers are raising   22
now about the potential consequences of revaluation – such as the loss of 
competitiveness, a less dynamic export sector and a decline in investment growth – have 
been asked before. Second, the currency adjustments of the early 1970s were successful 
in stabilizing the external balance of Germany and Japan. Between 1975 and 1985 the 
German current account surplus was 0.5 per cent of GDP on average, close to zero. While 
Japan's appreciation path was somewhat slower than the German one, the country 
continued to have moderate current account surpluses of less than 1 per cent of GDP on 
average. Finally, an interesting insight emerges from figure 9, which plots how unit labor 
costs evolved relative to the United States in these years. It is evident that only a small 
part of the difference in unit labor costs was corrected by wage increases ahead of 
productivity gains. Both Germany and Japan (like China in the past decade) were 
successful in limiting wage increases to the pace of productivity gains, leaving 
competitiveness unchanged. Some limited wage pressure was visible in Germany in the 
late 1960s, but the large adjustments in relative production costs and the catching-up in 
dollar incomes happened mainly through large exchange rate adjustments. We do not find 
convincing historical evidence for the adjustment mechanism of wage and price pressure 

































































































Fig. 9: US-dollar based unit labor costs 
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VI. The case for Chinese currency adjustment 
 
The Chimerican era is drawing to a close. After the bursting of the debt and housing 
bubbles, U.S. household savings will have to rise again. Washington aims to buffer this 
necessary adjustment by running sizeable budget deficits.  Public dis-saving can 
temporarily compensate for higher private savings to maintain final demand, but the 
American consumer faces a lengthy adjustment period and will ultimately have to pay the 
bill for this fiscal largesse. Beijing's first response to the collapse in global demand was 
to loosen credit and pump money into domestic construction and infrastructure projects. 
In the first six months of 2009 the government in Beijing ordered the banks to make new 
loans of close to 10 trillion renminbi or about 40 per cent of GDP. If these numbers can 
be trusted, China is going through one of the most remarkable experiments in monetary 
history. Stimulating domestic demand is, of course, the right policy response. But while 
these policies may ease the transition towards a more balanced economy, albeit at a cost 
to future taxpayers, a structural adjustment will still have to occur in the international 
economy. U.S. consumption will have to grow considerably less than U.S. production for 
a sustained period.  
As long as exchange rate policy implicitly taxes consumption and subsidizes 
exports in China, surpluses will persist and a reorientation towards domestic growth will 
face important structural headwinds. Sooner or later relative prices between the two 
economies will have to change (Feldstein, 2008). A major exchange rate revaluation is in 
the American interest for at least three reasons. First and foremost, exchange rate 
adjustment would help the reorientation of the U.S. economy. Chinese currency policy 
effectively forces an overvalued real exchange rate on the United States. Simply put, 
because Beijing keeps the exchange rate fixed, the dollar cannot devalue against China 
(and other parts of Asia) despite the large U.S. trade deficits. This makes it impossible for 
the American economy to earn its way out of the slump. Without an exchange rate 
adjustment, the United States will be forced to run expansive domestic policies if it wants 
to achieve full employment (Wolf, 2009). In theory, to be sure, the United States could   24
deflate to regain competitiveness against Asia, but deflation is out of the question for 
such a highly leveraged economy. 
Second, by allowing the United States to import demand from abroad, exchange 
rate adjustment would lessen the potentially dangerous reliance of U.S. economic policies 
on measures to stimulate domestic demand. American fiscal policy is clearly on an 
unsustainable path and it is hard to judge the consequences of the financial distortions 
and potentially inflationary outcomes caused by zero interest rates and quantitative 
easing. To the extent that exports could become a meaningful source of U.S. growth 
again, such highly experimental policies could be ended sooner.  
Finally, a Chinese exchange rate adjustment would reduce the risk of potentially 
grave trade frictions not only between the United States and Asia, but also between 
Europe and Asia. China's implicit dollar peg leads to the paradoxical situation that the 
renminbi devalues on a trade-weighted basis as the dollar continues its downward 
trajectory against the other major currencies. Sooner or later Europe, Japan and the other 
Asian economies will have to object if Chimerica as a bloc devalues against the rest of 
the world. If the United States is serious about its commitment to globalization and free 
trade, it cannot connive at a policy of Sino-American competitive devaluation that creates 
new distortions for the world economy.  
A case can also be made that revaluation is in the Chinese interest. A further 
substantial increase in the volumes of U.S. government debt and dollars in circulation 
cannot be in the interest of biggest holder of U.S. Treasuries.  After a decade of rapid 
reserve accumulation, policy makers in Beijing discovered in early 2009 how far their 
growth strategy had made them dependent on policy choices in Washington D.C. that 
were dictated primarily by domestic concerns (Dyer, 2009). In short order, the U.S. 
government announced a $1.5 billion budget deficit and the Federal Reserve decided to 
buy hundreds of billions of government and agency debt. Recent Chinese statements 
questioning the future of the dollar as an international reserve currency (for example the 
proposal that  the IMF's Special Drawing Rights become an alternative to dollars) have to 
be understood in this context. Beijing knows very well that in the short term there is no 
good alternative to the dollar. It is the vehicle currency for more than 80 per cent of Asian 
trade (Goldberg, 2005). It remains the predominant currency in central bank reserves. For   25
historical and political reasons, Asian governments are reticent to accept their neighbors' 
currencies as a store of value.  
True, the euro now offers financial markets of depth and liquidity comparable 
with those of the United States. Yet meaningful diversification of reserves is ultimately 
incompatible with a dollar-only peg. In theory, Beijing could diversify out of Treasuries 
into other fixed income assets or equities. But not many countries will accept large equity 
stakes of the Chinese government or government-controlled companies in key sectors of 
domestic industries. This explains why the preferred Chinese strategy at the time of 
writing is to acquire stakes in commodity-producing assets like mines and oilfields in 
comparatively poor and politically unstable countries where concerns about foreign 
ownership are less of a political obstacle. But such a policy does not address the 
underlying problem of renminbi undervaluation.  
In brief, the sooner China faces the fact that it cannot avoid sizeable losses – say 
about 20 per cent of GDP in renminbi terms – on its dollar reserves, the better. These 
financial losses will be a modest price to pay for a development model that propelled 
China from Third World status to an economic powerhouse in less than 15 years 
(Subramanian, 2009) and will in any case be more than compensated for by the increase 
in the dollar value of China's vast stock of RMB assets. With seven million jobs lost, the 
U.S. economy so far has taken a disproportionate share of the economic costs of the 
Chimerican divorce. It is in the interests of both sides that China play its role in the 
rebalancing of the world economy—to say nothing of the interests of the rest of the 
developed world, notably America's partners in Europe and Japan, who are taking most 





The lesson of German and Japanese history is that exporters can live with significant 
exchange rate appreciation when major gains in productivity are being made. Today, as 
in the 1970s, sizeable changes in exchange rates are needed to rebalance the world 
economy. The world economy's key structural imbalance is that the second biggest   26
economy in the world has pegged its currency to that of the largest economy at a strongly 
undervalued rate.  The troubling possibility is that China is unwilling to risk the 
consequences of revaluation, much less a transition to convertibility, and would prefer to 
keep Chimerica going at the price of further increasing SAFE's holdings of dollar 
denominated bonds. The implications of such a continuation of Chimerica for the rest of 
the world are clear. A continuation of Chimerica and Beijing's undervalued dollar peg at 
a time of dollar weakness would introduce new and dangerous distortions to the global 
economy.  The dollar depreciation that seems a likely consequence of current U.S. fiscal 
and monetary policy would be accompanied by a further Chinese depreciation relative to 
other major currencies. Ironically, the principal sufferers from a Chimerican depreciation 
would be Germany and Japan, whose export-led growth strategy China has so 
successfully copied, but without the exchange rate appreciation that made their economic 
rise so much less destabilizing to the global economy.  
While the temptation to continue business as usual might be great, it is ultimately 
no longer in the American interest to remain in such a dysfunctional marriage. A policy 
of Sino-American competitive devaluation at the expense of U.S. allies in Europe and 
Japan is politically short-sighted and dangerous for global trade. A renminbi revaluation 
would help the reorientation of the U.S. economy and potentially allow a quicker exit 
from the extreme policies currently being implemented by the Fed and the Treasury, 
which carry uncertain risks for the inflation outlook, global liquidity and capital flows. It 
would also solve at a stroke the problem of China’s excessively large international 
reserves and dollar exposure. Historically, periodic exchange rate revaluation has been 
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